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PREFACE 
This Research Report presents a comprehensive review of the 
theoretical aspects which should be considered in the evaluation of 
options for management of the New Zealand inshore fishery. Publication 
of this material is intended to stimulate a rigorous examination of the 
basis for fisheries management policies. The point is made that all 
aspects of the situation should be included in the analysis of policy 
options and that the resulting policy should be determined efficiently 
upon the basis of economic and social objectives. 
Dr R A Sandrey is a lecturer with the Department of 
Agricultural Economics and Marketing at Lincoln College and Ms D K 
O'Donnell is the Scientific Liaison Officer with the Department of 
Scientific & Industrial Research, Wellington. 
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SUMMARY 
The New Zealand inshore fin fishing industry has a problem of 
overfishing in certain prime species. This report examines the 
historical, distributional and economic efficiency aspects of managing 
the inshore fishery. 
Overfishing occurs when excessive harvesting reduces fish 
stocks below some desirable level and future benefits are foregone to 
provide for consumption now. Reducing harvest to correct for 
overfishing will lead to another problem - that of overcapitalisation. 
This occurs when a given level of harvest could be achieved by using 
less of societies financial resources. 
Chapter three looks at the effect of open access on a renewable 
resource and shows why an individual fisher has no economic incentive 
to preserve fish stocks under these conditions. The dynamics of 
fisheries harvest will lead to reduced future stocks in many situations 
unless some form of supply control is imposed. However, differences 
between maximising fish harvests and maximising the discounted present 
value of a resource are discussed and it is shown that in most cases, 
maximising physical yields is not an economically optimal solution. 
Alternative methods of reducing harvest are discussed. Gear 
restrictions and season closures neither address the common property 
issue nor lead to a minimum cost harvest. Taxes, either input or 
output, are theoretically appealing but difficulties include political 
opposition to their introduction, lack of flexibility in handling 
stochastic influences, and the problem of fishers locked into the 
industry with low incomes. The licensing of vessels or fishers is only 
a short term solution as technological changes can increase current 
capacity, thus continuing both overfishing and overcapitalisation. 
Finally, given that supply control is needed, transferable 
quotas present an excellent long term solution. However, the working 
of these quotas depend upon the initial allocation, accurate estimation 
of the quota level, and intervention costs. The issues of initial 
allocation of quotas and the distribution of economic rents are the two 
major equity issues involved with an introduction of quotas. Both of 
these issues are discussed. 
C~apter six looks at economies of scale in the fishing industry 
using duality theory. Constant returns to fuel and diseconomies of 
scale to labour are found to exist, although the restrictive 
assumptions used in the analysis may limit the importance of these 
findings. 
If supply controls are introduced, effort transfer to less 
preferred and alternative fish species should be encouraged to lessen 
the need to instigate a buy-back policy and to reduce disruption to 
sectors of the fishing industry other than fishers. It is shown that 
the opportunity cost of not harvesting prime species and the initial 
infant industry costs may be accentuating the pressure on prime 
species. Transferable quotas will alleviate the first problem and some 
form of assistance may be needed to overcome the second problem. 
(xi) 
Several alternative species are shown to have potential value to 
inshore fishery. Additionally, quality improvement (added value) 
the need for fisheries extension services are discussed. 
conditions which would lessen the need for an intervention policy 
listed. A discussion showing the effects of each of these is 
with snapper as an example. 
the 
and 
The 
are 
given 
Finally, it is considered that before any policy is adopted it 
must be shown that clear economic benefits result from a change in the 
present system. The paper argues that the presence of biological 
overfishing is not clear proof of the need to restructure the industry. 
However, if supply control is introduced then transferable quotas are 
economically efficient provided that enforcement and administrative 
costs are not excessive. Equity is ensure if initial allocation is 
fair and the rents accrue to the residents of New Zealand. The 
industry in general need not suffer if consideration is given to effort 
transfer. 
(xii) 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The New Zealand inshore fin fishing indust~y has a problem of 
overfishing in certain prime species. This situation occurs when 
excessive harvesting reduces fish stocks below some desirable level and 
the future regeneration of these stocks is threatened. This imposes a 
"cost", in the form of a sacrifice of future potential harvest and 
consumption of the stocks. In resource economics, the present value of 
this cost has become known as the "user cost". Additionally, the cost 
of overcapitalisation is borne by society if corrective measures are 
needed to reduce fishing effort. Overcapitalisation occurs when the 
desired level of harvest could be obtained by employing less financial 
resources than are currently being employed. 
If a reduction in harvest is called for, then by definition 
this reduced harvest can be obtained by less effort than is currently 
being employed and excess capacity will initially exist in the 
industry. Thus, a solution to the first problem inevitably causes the 
second problem. Normally problems of overcapitalisation can be 
corrected over time by a transfer of financial resources to alternative 
sectors of the economy using the familiar market mechanism. However, 
resources become locked into the indust~y, thus accentuating the 
initial problem of overfishing. 
Species facing severe overfishing are snapper, trevally, 
groper, school shark and rig. Additionally, some overfishing may be 
occurring with terakihi, red gurnard and warehou. Regionally, 
Northland (East Coast), West Auckland, Hauraki Gulf and the Bay of 
Plenty face the most serious problems. Concern over this problem has 
been intensifying over the last three years, during which time a ban 
has been imposed on any increase in the inshore fishing effort. This 
moratorium was only designed as an interim measure and currently a 
longer term solution to the problem of too much pressure on the prime 
species is being considered by fishers. The proposed new package of 
measures has a plan to allocate individual transferable quotas to 
fishers, and to incorporate financial assistance to fishers who 
voluntarily reduce their catches. It has been estimated that some $28 
million of taxpayers' funds may be needed to effect this reduction, of 
which $26 million is needed in the four North Island regions mentioned 
above (National Fisheries Management Advisory Committee, 1983). 
Only a small number of vessels land most of the inshore catch, 
with some 1.5 percent of the fleet landing half the catch. Twenty 
percent of all vessels account for ninety percent of the catch. During 
1983 additional measures were taken to preserve the fish stocks and 
some 3,500 part-time and smaller operators were removed from the 
industry. No compensation is sought for these part-timers who 
represented half of the fishers and landed about five percent of the 
domestic catch (Berryman, 1983). Although a few of these fishers have 
been able to reinstate their licences, most have been forced to leave 
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the industry. No research has been undertaken into the social and 
economic backgrounds of these part-timers or the impacts on their lives 
or livelihoods of removing their licences. 
This report summarises the historical, distributional and 
economic efficiency aspects of managing the inshore fishery. The 
proposed new management measures are examined from these perspectives. 
A discussion on how economic and biological considerations affect the 
inshore fishery is given using New Zealand snapper as an example. The 
potential for effort transfer is considered as a solution to the 
overfishing problem in certain species. 
CHAPTER 2 
OVERVIEW OF THE HISTORY OF FISHERIES 
MANAGEMENT 
Whaling was introduced to New Zealand in 1792, almost 50 years 
before British sovereignty was proclaimed and before the first 
immigrants arrived under an organised colonization scheme. By the turn 
of the 19th century falling prices for whale products and the drastic 
reduction of commercially important whale species lead to the demise of 
the industry. Populations have never fully recovered. 
New Zealand's jurisdiction extended to three nautical miles off 
the coast - historically the distance of a cannonball shot. By 1914 a 
policy of judicious exploitation was introduced, coupling fisheries 
development with conservation. This policy was reversed in 1927 with 
conservation as the sole objective. Seasonal closures for all methods 
of fishing were introduced and Danish seining was prohibited because it 
was deemed to be excessively efficient. Northern fishers established a 
strong and successful lobby to get an exemption for their area. In 
1929, trawling in the Hauraki Gulf was also prohibited. 
Licensing was introduced in 1936 for the catching, wholesaling 
and retailing sectors under the first Labour government. Further 
action was taken in 1937 following concern at overfishing although the 
total catch at the time was only 30,000 tonnes. This catch level ought 
to be compared with the 470,000 tonnes that was extracted from New 
Zealand's waters in 1977, although the latter case included the deep 
water fishing. It seems likely that in the aftermath of the Depression 
fishers were concerned with depressed market prices for fish (Riley, 
1980). 
In 1945 a one-man licensing authority was established which 
introduced mlnlmum fish sizes, gear restrictions, area closures and 
non-transferable vessel licences. These licences specified one port 
for landing fish. Although the sale. of licences was technically 
illegal, the fishing industry appears to have had little difficulty in 
finding ways around the law. Old fishermen tell stories of 
rotten-hulled dingies with a licence number clearly painted on the side 
being sold for thousands of pounds. A wide disparity in fish prices 
was also evident at this time. The fact that high priced prime species 
in one port were being discarded in other ports and vice versa, simply 
highlights how familiarity with fish species can lead to entrenched 
consumer attitudes. With high profits obtairiable from prime species 
there was no pressure to market the lesser known species. 
By 1955 the restriction to land into only one port became 
impractical. Larger vessels with a greater fishing range blurred the 
boundaries between the different regions. This restriction was removed 
but limited licensing remained., Enthusiasm for developing the fishing 
industry and its export potential culminated in open access fishing 
being introduced in 1963 along with the formation of the Fishing 
3. 
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Industry Board. In 1965 New Zealand's fishing zone was extended to 12 
miles. Foreign licensed vessels were phased out of this zone and only 
allowed to operate more than 12 miles offshore by 1970 (Bradstock, 
1979). This changed in 1978 when the 200 mile Exclusive Economic Zone 
was put into effect. The effects of this additional effort beyond the 
12 mile zone are being felt today. A second major cause of 
over-fishing was the encouragement given to the domestic industry by 
the Government from 1978 to 1984 in the form of low interest and 
suspensory loans and duty free importation of new and near-new vessels. 
A raft of controls were introduced in 1963 for the Foveaux 
Strait Oyster Fishery to prevent the explosion of fishing effort which 
would have accompanied open access. This has generally been lauded as 
a management success. In contrast, the Nelson scallop fishery 
collapsed within 15 years of having an open access policy. Scallops, 
Ellesmere eels and rock lobster are now all managed through controlled 
fisheries. 
In recent years foreign effort has largely been replaced by 
co-operative ventures and domestic deepwater vessels. The squid and 
bluefin fisheries are controlled by vessel numbers but the deepwater 
demersal fishery is managed through a policy of individual 
transferable quotas which was introduced in 1982. 
CHAPTER .3 
THEORETICAL ISSUES OF FISHERIES MANAGEMENT 
The effect of open access on a renewable common property 
resource is well known to analysts. The following account summarises 
some of the major points to set the stage for the discussion later in 
the paper. 
It is instructive to begin the analysis by looking at a 
representative individual fishers harvesting decision. Following the 
basic managerial response of operating where marginal costs are equated 
to marginal revenue (i.e. the cost of the last fish landed is equal to 
its contribution to revenue), each individual will harvest at point E 
as shown in Figure 1. Marginal costs facing the fisher (MC) are 
rising, and the contribution to revenue (MR) of each fish is constant 
as more and more fish are harvested. l Included in the marginal cost are 
the operating costs of running the vessel (fuel, crew, depreciation, 
etc) and all opportunity costs faced by the fisher. These opportunity 
costs are the value of resources (capital, labour, management) in the 
next best alternative use. However, not included in these costs are 
the user costs introduced earlier. These user costs are included in 
the societal cost curve, MC'. Although each individual will be 
affected in the future by collective harvesting decisions, a given 
fisher has no economic incentive to reduce harvest in the current 
period. If individuals had that incentive (or compulsion) to reduce 
harvest, the SOCially optimal harvest of E* would be the individual 
fishers response, where MC' is equated to marginal revenue. This is 
FIGURE 1 
Individual Fishers' Cost Curves 
=========================:=========:==============:==================== 
Cost $ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
fMC' 
c 
r-----------... --~,L--___ -_~IR 
L---------------------~----~r--------------~arvest E* E 
======================================================~===~~~========== 
1 Although marginal revenue for the industry may be declining, most 
individual fishers will not influence the price of fish. 
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essentially the tragedy of the commons - all fishers contribute to the 
problem and would benefit from its solution, but no incentive is 
offered to individuals to work towards a reduction in harvest under an 
open access policy. If one fisher reduces harvest, that catch will be 
landed by another. 
Resource management of a common property resource is firstly a 
problem of finding the optimal harvest (E*) for each specie which 
maximises collective benefits over time from the resource stocks. 
Secondly, fisheries resource management is concerned with designing a 
scheme to ensure that the catch is restrai~ed to that level. Returning 
to Figure 1, this means we should reduce effort and move back to\vards 
E*. Finding the optimal level of effort is a complex calculation, and 
presumes an understanding of parameters that in practice are seldom 
knowable with preclslon. So far we have been concerned solely with 
private resource use. However, intervention by the State to direct 
private resource use introduces the need to economise on tax funds as 
well as fishery resources. As Wilson (1982) points out, it is not 
difficult to conceive of a fisheries management scheme in which the 
gross social benefits of improved fisheries management are outweighed 
by the costs of intervention by the State or a State sponsored agency. 
A static analysis can be useful to demonstrate the immediate 
effects of reducing effort. This is shown in Figure 2, where industry 
effort is reduced from Q to Q'. Fish prices will increase to the 
extent that demand is less than perfectly elastic, as demonstrated by 
the move from P to Pd in Figure 2. 
FIGURE 2 
The Value of Fish Quotas 
==========================================:~====:====================== 
s' 
Price $ 
Pd 
P 
Ps 
Q' Q Harvest (Effort) 
==================================================================~==== 
7. 
In the presence of the quota restriction, economic rents accrue 
to the quota holders equal to the differences between the demand (Pd) 
and supply price (Ps) per unit. To the extent that marginal operators 
harvest costs are above average industry cost this will understate 
economi.c rents and enable the efficient operator to pay more for a 
quota. Thi.s raises two distributional issues. The first concerns who 
should receive the rents - the State, all existing fishers or large 
fishers. The second issue concerns how to transfer quotas. These 
issues will be addressed later. 
The collective effect of individual operators can be seen by 
examining the diagram (Figure 3) used to demonstrate the common 
property problem. As more and more effort is put into fishing,2 the 
catch (in tonnes) will first increase. As the effort continues to 
increase, the catch will initially increase. However, this increase 
(shown as point A) is not sustainable. The greatest sustainable catch 
possible is at Ymax, the so-called maximum sustainable (MSY). Point B 
with a catch of C tonnes is the best that can be hoped for by 
continuing to harvest with effort at Y. Biological overfishing is, by 
definition, taking place as the stocks are being harvested faster than 
they can be regenerated. Note also that a catch of C can be 
accomplished with either effort Y or Y'. 
Calch 
(tonnes) 
c 
FIGURE 3 
Catch/Effort Relationships 
MSY 
K-------------+-------------------------------------~--------~---E±forL y' y' 
==============================================~======================== 
2 This effort can either be measured by increased effort from 
existing operators or new entrants to the industry. Both are 
possibilities in an open access situation as long as economic 
incentives operate to expand effort. 
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Given the relationship above and common property conditions, at 
what level should the fish stocks be harvested? To conceptualise this, 
refer to Figure 4, where the sustainable yield curve is translated to 
total revenue expressed as a function of effort. This is a long term 
equilibrium situation, as is Figure 3. The sustainable yield curve 
(Figure 3) and sustainable total revenue curve (Figure 4) will have a 
similar shape, with any difference caused by the price responsiveness 
of the market. Total cost is the cost faced by individuals and does 
not include the user cost. Effort will expand to Y, where total costs 
are equated to total revenue. 3 The same total revenue can be obtained 
at y' with less effort, thus a misallocation of resources is occurring. 
An economic rent to the resource is indicated at Y' by the difference 
between total revenue and total cost. Maximisation of this economic 
rent will occur at some undetermined poInt where marginal costs equal 
marginal revenue, and this point is referred to in the literature as 
the maximum economic yield. Many authors have suggested that maximum 
economic yield is desirable, but as Clark (1976, p.30) points out, this 
ignores the dynamics of the model. All we can say is that if stocks 
are threatened at Y, then it is probable that effort should be reduced 
from Y. 
FIGURE 4 
Fishing Effort and Revenue 
=================================:===========~==;=====~================ 
$ 
Revenue 
Max Sustainable 
Total Revenue 
~~~------~------------------------------~------~~ Effort 
y' Ymax Y 
===================================::=========~==============.======:=== 
3 This is because new entrants will be attracted to the industry as 
long as some profits can be made. This will continue until all 
rent is dissipated (Clark 1976, p2S-26). 
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Although Figures 3 and 4 help to understand the nature of a 
common property resource, many questions are ignored. For example, is 
the total revenue curve changing because of changes in total yield or 
is there a price response? As shown In Figure 2, both the price effect 
(slope of the demand curve) and the marginal cost (slope of the supply 
curve) will influence the economic rent, so it is important to know 
these relationships. Additionally, the role of discounting is ignored. 
If a zero discount rate is used and there is no price effect, then the 
biologically optimal point (YI1AX, MSY in Figure 3) and the point of 
maximum total sustainable revenue will be the optimal harvest level. 
When these conditions do not hold, then finding the economically 
optimal harvest rate becomes complex, and could be to either the left 
or right of the MSY point. Obviously, any harvest greater than MSY 
(point A, Figure 3) cannot be an equilibrium level of harvest, and this 
point is elaborated upon in the next two diagrams. 
Decreasing current effort to Q' will increase the harvest in 
the future if overfishing is taking place. This is the backward 
bending supply curve in a dynamic sense, and is shown in Figure 5. 
Effort increases as the price rises, short term yields increase (point 
A, Figure 3) past a sustainable yield (MSY), and future yields decrease 
as this level of harvest cannot be sustained. (Clark, 1976, p.154; 
Hannesson, 1979, p.65). 
FIGURE 5 
Backward Bending Fish Supply Curve 
$ 
Price 
~~----------------------M-S-y---------------------Yield 
Unless some restriction is placed on harvest, an open access 
situation may lead to reduced future supplies where high prices entice 
10. 
increased effort from fishers. The same result can be expected 
artificial lowering of the cost structure, as has happened 
Zealand with input subsidies (New Zealand Treasury, 1984). 
from an 
in New 
Dynamic effects upon the fish stocks are shown in Figure 6. 
Starting from the current time period (t~), fish stocks are at a level 
given by Xo. Concern is expressed because the optimal stock level is 
considered to be higher at X*. Resource managers now have to decide 
upon an optimal time path from time to. This is precisely the problem 
for some species of fish in the New Zealand inshore industry (NAFl1AC, 
1983, M.A.F., 1984). The dynamic nature of the problem is such that if 
X* was the optimal time path at time zero, it may not be the optimal 
time path at t. This is the Samuelson Turnpike theorem; once we have 
left the "turnpike" X*, it may not be optimal to return to that path • 
. Clark (1976) has shown that the factors influencing the optimal rate 
are the time horizon, the price responsiveness to changes in supply, 
the discount rate used, and the stock recruitment rate. 
FIGURE 6 
Resource Stocks Over Time 
=====================================~=================~=============== 
Stocks 
X* 
I 
I 
I 
I 
L-............... --......................... --.............................. --~~ ....................................................... ~time 
t 
===============================================~======================= 
The planning horizon receives little consideration in practice, 
although determination of the time period may alter the path. 
Increasing the terminal period (T) to infinity implies an application 
of the Turnpike theorem as shown in Figure 6. 
The path advocated for threatened inshore species is to harvest 
an interim yield lower than the proposed long term yield (NAFMAC, 1983, 
MAF, 1984). Let us call the point .in time at which harvest changes 
from interim to long term harvest t. This gives a different time path 
from present time to the change, to to t, than from the change onwards, 
t to T. No economic or biological justification for these differing 
time paths is provided by the New Zealand fisheries managers, except in 
very general terms: "The chances of recovery are improved if in the 
short term catches are dropped below present sustainahle yields" 
(Major, 1984), and "The need, therefore, is to reduce catches to a 
level that will enable fish stocks to recover to their previous 
levels ••• " (MAF, 1984). 
This problem of differing time paths is not trivial and should 
be given serious consideration. The objectives of (a) maximising the 
sustained physical yield from the fisheries and (b) maximising the 
discounted economic benefits f~om the resource will produce different 
harvest policies in most cases. Economists' contribution to resource 
~anagement have been to demonstrate this basic principle and point out 
that the policy (a) above is generally not optimal (Lewis, 1982, p.62, 
Larkin, 1977). 
Lewis is very specific on this issue: 
"The most important implication of our models is that the 
policy of maximising the sustained physical yield from 
the fishery is generally not optimal .•• The policy is 
deficient in that it fails to specify the rate at which 
the fishery should approach its optimal steady state 
population if it is initially displaced from it ••• 
Although the inefficiencies of the maximum yield policy 
have been discussed repeatedly in the literature, the 
policy is still retained by most fishery commissions 
because it is deemed to be "workable". 
Even if the maximum yield policy is followed because it is 
easier, the economic advantages of this maximum yield policy need to be 
compared with alternative policy options. 
Given that we are optimising economic returns from the resource 
over time, subject to constraints, the economic problem may be 
expressed as: 
Max PV = Je -rt R eX, E) dt (1) 
where: PV present value 
r discount rate 
R net revenues (Revenue minus total costs, including user 
and social costs) 
E = harvest or effort (assuming linearity) 
X fish stocks 
t time 
4 This ignores the trivial case where no harvest is taking place 
because either the cost is too high or the price is too low to 
attract any entrants to the industry. We assume that some level 
of harvest is occurring. 
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Changes in price 3re reflected in R, 3nd 3S discussed earlier 
(Figure 2) we would expect the optimal harvest to be less with a priee 
responsive resource. The price el3sticity of demand is a measure of 
the degree of responsiveness. 
Uncertainty as to future price trends complicates analysis of 
optimal harvests. If real prices are increasing over time, and changes 
in effort are costless, then delaying harvest may increase benefits. 
Anderson (1977, p.43-46) discusses this relationship in a present value 
framework between two time periods, but this can be extended to several 
time periods using a control model. If the converse holds, and fish 
prices are dropping, then an increased harvest is called for. The 
assumption of costless changes in effort may be an heroic one, as this 
assumes a high opportunity value can be placed upon the fishing capital 
~nd some alternative use exists in the short term for this displaced 
capital. 
A similar increase in harvest can be expected with a high 
discount rate (equation 1). Using a zero discount rate implies that 
the optimal harvest is approximated by the maximum biological yield, 
while an infinite rate will lead to the same harvest as an open access 
situation. Some positive real rate will be intermedi3te between these 
two extremes (all other influences held constant). 
The stock recruitment rate or growth function (i) will also 
have some impact upon the optimal time path (Anderson, 1977; Clark, 
1976). With a specie that has a long life span coupled with low 
reproductive rates the optimal path may be to harvest early and 
possibly eliminate the species. Faster growing and highly reproductive 
species such as squid are the opposite situation - increased economic 
justification can be made to reduce the short term harvest for long 
term benefits. 
Equation (1) can be re-expressed using transition equations to 
model the change in resource stocks from one time period to the next. 
This approach is particularly applicable to a fish resource, and 
follows the necessary conditions derived by Burt and Cummings (1970) 
for the optional exploitation (harvest) rate of a given resource. 
Changes in resource levels depend upon the natural growth rate, 
f(X), (or (X» and the actual harvest level, H, and can be represented 
as: 
x = X + f (X ) - H 
t-I-l t t t 
(2) 
where Xt+1 represents resource stocks in the next time period and other 
variables are as defined. For a renewable resource f (X t ) is greater 
than zero, i.e. a positive growth rate. This assumes that we are 
looking at some point below the maximum sustainable biomass, as f(Xt ) 
will be zero in this trivial case. Harvest can be equal to or greater 
than zero indicating non-negativity in the harvest rate. 
In 
refine this 
capital and 
harvest, H , 
t 
equation (1) E was defined as harvest or effort. We can 
by making E a composite variable representing inputs of 
labour to the harvest process and making the actual 
dependent upon effort as: 
(3) 
where g (.) is the production function for harvesting. We can 
assume that the harvest rate will decline with smaller fish stocks 
(dg/dx>O) as fish become harder to locate. This is the refinement of 
equation (1) ,.,here harvest and effort were considered to be linear. 
Incorporating equation (3) into equation (2) we can follow the 
approach used by Lewis (1982) to allow for uncertainty in both resource 
growth and natural depletion rates. This can be represented as: 
(4) 
where NJ and N2 are random variables. The changes in natural growth 
rate are represented by N" while N2 might represent random changes in 
the water temperature and weather conditions. We would assume that the 
expected values of these variables are both equal to one over time with 
a fixed distribution. 
Selection of the optimal harvest rate, H*, reduces to 
maxlmlsing the present value of the resource stock as discussed in 
equation (1) and shown in Figure 6 as X*. Equation (4) enables the 
effect of uncertainty to be seen more clearly. Producers generally are 
risk averse in their price attitude, and fishers have not demonstrated 
an attitude which differs from the norm (Lewis, 1982). This 
effectively means that consideration must be given to a "safety margin" 
in allocating harvesting rights if society adopts the same \[ie~.,. This 
uncertainty can be extended to account for changes in costs and 
revenues between years and systematic changes in the distribution of 
variables over time. Interaction between stocks can be considered as 
well as the important issue in fisheries economics of nonobservable 
stocks. The reader is referred to Lewis (1982), Clark (1976), 
Hannesson (1978), Dasgupta (1982), or Anderson (1977) for a more 
rigorous mathematical treatment of this problem using a control theory 
framework. 
Limiting access will not automatically remedy fishery 
management problems, as more factors are involved than just simply the 
problem of open access (Rothschild, 1983). Many actors are involved in 
the play besides fishers - boatbuilders, processors, policy managers, 
bankers, retailers, exporters, and the final consumer. These 
interactions, as well as complex biological interactions in the fish 
stocks, need to be recognised in long term management plans. 
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Problems of over fishing are accentuated by fluctuating incomes 
and government policies formulated to encourage fishing. During 
periods of high incomes, measured by increased prices, high yields, or 
lowered costs, investment is encouraged in the industry. When returns 
decrease, these same investments may be trapped because of low 
opportunity values, staying in the industry and continuing the problems 
of overfishing. This is essentially the problem known to agricultural 
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economists as asset fixity (Johnson and Pasour, 1981). With the next 
swing in prices, more investment is encouraged and the cycle continues. 
The end result may be what Crutchfield (1979, p.746) describes as the 
ultimate absurdity as investment is encouraged because prices are 
rising due to biological scarcity, thus contributing to the over fishing 
of the species. The expansion of the domestic fleet following the 
introduction of the 200 mile zone in 1978 has been an example of this 
asset fixity situation. Many of the vessels built ostensibly for the 
deep water were found to be too small to work offshore and have become 
locked into the inshore fleet. 
Open access will usually lead to overfishing. Some form of 
supply control may be needed to ensure the optimal harvest rate, but 
finding that optimal rate is likely to be a non-trivial problem. Once 
found, that harvest rate is likely to be modified by many factors. 
Positive discount rates, falling real prices, short term planning 
horizons, and slow biological growth and reproductive rates will tend 
to increase the optimal harvest. Similarly, increasing real returns, 
high growth and reproductive rates, and a long planning horizon will 
tend to decrease harvest. Input subsidies and asset fixity will 
accentuate the problems of overfishing, and indirectly, 
overcapitalisation. 
CHAPTER 4 
POLICY OPTIONS FOR SUPPLY CONTROL 
The objective of thisChaDter is to examine alternative policy 
options available to restrict harvest of a species. Although each 
policy has the common goal to reduce harvest, and in theory the final 
result should be the same, adjustment mechanisms differ for the 
policies. Additionally, costs, measured as direct and indirect costs, 
differ for each policy. Specific emphasis is given to the option of 
individual transferrable quotas. 
Four alternative methods of 
considered for fisheries management: 
supply control are commonly 
(a) gear restrictions and seaSon closures; 
(b) taxes on either inputs or outputs; 
(c) licence schemes; 
(d) quotas, both total resource and individual. 
Limitations of the first three are well documented (Howe, 1979, 
Clark, 1976, Hannesson, 1979, Bell, 1978). Gear restrictions may well 
protect a resource, but usually lead to distortions from a minimum cost 
harvest. Seasonality closure may be necessary to protect spatvning 
stock in some cases, but are a very artificial form of control and do 
not address the common property problem. Harvest can always be reduced 
by outlawing everything except the use of bent pins on Tuesdays! At 
best, both regulated inefficiency and season closures are short term 
solutions treating symptoms and not causes of problems. Difficulties 
include little flexibility in handling stochastic influences and the 
problem of fishers "locked" into the system in periods of low returns. 
The use of taxes on either inputs or outputs to internalise the 
externalities are a theoretically appealing solution. Referring back 
to Figure 2 (ChaPter 3) enables the effects to be seen. A tax on 
inputs will shift the marginal cost curve (MC) to the left and will 
increase the direct cost to a fisher for any given harvest. Similarly, 
a tax on output should reduce effort by lowering the marginal revenue 
curve (MR). Societies marginal cost curve (MC') will only move to the 
left if transaction and enforcement costs are involved. Taxes on 
either inputs or outputs paid by fishers are transfer payments, and in 
the case of, for example, a fuel tax, transaction and enforcement cost 
would be very low. Thus the MC and HC' curves would move closer 
together and E would approach E*. 
It is important to look at the objective or motives for placing 
a tax on either inputs or output. It will be argued later that fees 
should be imposed upon transferable quotas, but this is because of 
distributional considerations once an economically efficient policy is 
adopted. The usual concept of tax (as discussed with reference to 
Figure 2) is to use these taxes to move towards an optimal policy. 
Thus the instrument is used to enhance efficiency. 
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Difficulties of taxes include political opposition to their 
introduction, lack of flexibility in handling stochastic influences, 
and the asset fixity problem of fishers locked into the system. New 
Zealand fishers are concecned about rising costs and particuLirly fuel 
costs, in the fishing industry (France, 1981, Kenton, 1983, Dickie, 
1983). It should be pointed out that without those rising fuel costs 
of the late 1970's and early 1980's, the overfishing problem may well 
have become worse at the present time. However, even though fuel 
prices have acted to restrict supply there lnay well have been a 
compensatory increase in fish prices (and profits) with this reduced 
supply, thus the overall effect may be ambiguous. The task of a 
manager informing fishers that incomes must be reduced to ensure the 
long term viability of the industry is not an enviable one. 
Substitutability of resources out of fishing may be slow, thus the 
problem of low incomes may persist for some considerable time before 
the initial problem of overfishing is overcome. Thus an attempt to 
solve one problem (overfishing) may lead directly to an equally serious 
and more politically sensitive problem (fishers' incomes). Fishing 
effort may in fact increase because of the lower costs of new entra~ts 
as a result of buying "written down" vessels. 
Licensing of vessels or fishers is also only a short term 
solution. Productive capacity of an existing vessel can be increased 
and contribute to both overfishing and overcapitalisation. Thus, 
although licensing, taxes, closures and gear restrictions can 
undoubtedly all have some beneficial effects, they also have problems. 
This leaves the option of quotas. Total seasonal quotas have 
been applied. They will usually lead to a modern times Oklahoma land 
rush as fishers compete for their share of the quota. Individual 
quotas, expressed as a percentage of the allocated catch, present an 
attractive solution. Short run efficiency is achieved as fishers have 
control over the choice of inputs to minimise cost. Once initial 
allocations have been made, transferability of quotas would facilitate 
long run efficiency. An open market enables operators to freely enter 
or leave the industry. There are two kinds of costs that would face 
individual fishers: the usual costs of production (harvest) and the 
costs (including opportunity) of holding or acquiring a fishing quota. 
Thus, in terms of traditional microeconomic theory, an operator will 
adjust marginally to a profit maximisation position. Formal 
mathematical proof of this is contained in an appendix by Moloney and 
Pearse (1979, p.865-6) and discussed in Clark (1982, p.28l), using the 
maximum principle. By the process of Walrasian tatonnement, rights 
will accrue to the efficient operators. Values of these rights will 
indicate values of the resource and also indicate the possible 
economies of size for each fishery by their eventual distribution. 
Transferability can either be on a temporary basis enabling 
some flexibility during a particular season, or a long term basis. 
Stochastic effects in yields for a particular species between seasons 
can be accommodated by setting a total species harvest and expr.essing 
individual quotas as a percentage. 
New Zealand has had experience with transferable quotas in the 
deep water fishery. The current inshore problem differs in many ways 
from the deep water industry. Major differences are that few operators 
are involved in the deep water recovery leading 
costs, and the initiRl allocation of quot;} Wil::> 
having to withdraw capacity from the industry. 
to lower enforcement 
facilitated by not 
Enforcement costs involved with policlng of an inshore quota 
system are likely to be high. Initial allocations of quotas to larger 
commercial operators may reduce these enforce~ent costs, as it is 
presumably easier to police a smaller number of vessels. HO'..vever, this 
may well be at the expense of an equitable allocation of the quotas and 
may not encourage the most efficient harvesting techniques. Selection 
of the quota allocation on the basis of administrative ease is most 
unlikely to lead to an appropriate distribution of wealth or increase 
earning potential amongst fishers. Such a procedure also begs the 
question as to whether the quota rights ought to be granted at zero 
'cost to fishers at all. There are some precedents in this area. 
Increasingly New Zealand import quotas are not granted to traders but 
are sold by tender on an annual basis resulting in the rent accruing to 
taxpayers. 
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Questions of the possible administrative options for the quotas 
are contained in Duncan (1984), albeit in a preliminary manner. A 
detailed description of current policy options is outlined in HAl" 
(1984). As discussed in Heaney (1980), enforcement costs are likely to 
depend upon both the marketing channels available and the unit value of 
the fish. Few market outlets are easy to control, but many small 
distributors accentuate the problem of keeping track of landings. 
Similarly, a high unit value of fish increases the incentive to sell 
undeclared catches. These administrative enforcement costs may 
constitute a considerable percentage of gains made to the industry by 
the quota system. 
Given that some form of supply control is needed, transferable 
quotas must be considered an excellent long tern solution. We concur 
with Campbell that ITQ's (Individual Transferable Quotas) provide a 
means whereby the effects of inadequate property rights may be 
mitigated. The working of ITQ's depends on three processes - initial 
allocation, estimation of total quota and enforcement of individual 
quotas (Campbell, 1985). Efficiency is enhanced by enabling operators 
to move to a least-cost situation and, provided the initial allocation 
is equitable, no major distributional issues are involved. A 
multi-species harvest can be accommodated by both an inter and intra 
seasonal transfer of quotas for each species. Intervention costs 
(enforcement and transaction costs) need to be considered, and could 
conceivably negate any benefits derived from the introduction of ITQ's. 
The need to equitably distribute the initial allocation of rights is a 
potentially contentious issue with equity implications. 
A similar conclusion is reached by Cunningham when discussing the role 
of economics in fisheries management: 
"ITQ's are very appealing on both theoretical and 
practical grounds, and certainly appear to be the best of 
the alternatives considered for economic regulation of 
fishing. They are compatible with reducing effort to any 
level desired, and with distributing whatever rent may 
accrue at this level in a socially optimal manner. Their 
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major drawbacks can be overcome simply by improving 
enforcement and by accepting that when managing a more or 
less randomly fluctuating resource, optimisation on the 
basis of some long-run average is about the best which 
can be expected." (Cunningham, 1983, p.77) 
CHAPTER 5 
DISTRIBUTIONAL ISSUES 
Some major equity issues are involved if a quota policy is 
introduced. The first issue has already been decided units not 
"wholly or substantially involved in the fishery" (NAFMAC, 1983) have 
been arbitrarily precluded from the industry. No compensatory 
arrangements have been discussed with this numerically large section of 
the industry who represent half the number of fishers. No attempt even 
appears to have been made to ascertain who these people are or the 
effects of precluding them from the industry. This decision is 
especially interesting in view of the call from commercial fishers for 
$28 million in compensation and the proposed vessel buyback tender 
system - the industry appears to have the power to decree who shall not 
participate in the gains from the compensation scheme, thus, by proxy, 
deciding who shall. Crutchfield (1982) and Pollnac and Littlefield 
(1983) both contain a discussion on possible effects on part-time 
fishers and social impacts. Indeed, as Scott (1979, p.731) suggests 
"arbitrary expulsion of part-timers and sport fishers with low catches 
should take a prize for high-handed, inefficient discrimination". 
Non-operated permits have also been cancelled, thus penalising another 
sector of the industry. 
Having made some preliminary decisions on who shall not be 
allocated quotas, the next major question is, how should the quotas be 
allocated. Given that quotas are freely transferrable, any initial 
distribution can be altered to achieve an optimal allocation. This is 
because holding a quota represents an opportunity cost to the fisher 
and will be a factor in the perceived revenue flow (Clark, 1982). 
Options to trade a quota can be included along with all other decisions 
open to an individual. Once allocated, quotas will have some value 
accrue to them, thus the distributional issue problem is the initial 
allocation (Moloney and Pearse, 1979; Crutchfield, 1982). This is the 
same issue addressed by Gardner with respect to re-distribution of 
Federal Lands in the United States. He concluded "once this initial 
re-distribution effect worked itself out, equity would cease to be so 
important an issue with market traded goods, since presumably no free 
market exchanges would occur unless both buyer and seller believed the 
trade would make them better off" (Gardner, 1983, p.223). 
Several systems exist for initial allocation of these rights. 
These include a tendering system coupled with a buy-back scheme, 
allocation based upon historical catch, or allocation based upon either 
investment or productive capacity in the industry (NAFMAC, 1983). One 
suggestion cited in Scott (1979) is for every active fisher in the 
industry to be allocated a portion of the quota, and fishers to be 
given an incentive to trade quotas to a suitable size to catch a 
profitable amount of fish. Such a system takes care of one aspect of 
the distributional problem, but leaves unanswered the question of the 
taxpayer's rights in such a scheme. Some economic rent could be 
extracted by setting a price on quotas to start at some predetermined 
date. Some short term adjustment problem would occur, and this is 
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recognised in the current debate. Allied with these decisions is the 
question of the form of the quotas - size of the parcel, maximum 
holding for any individual or company, time length of the allocation. 
Over-riding some of these considerations is the possible question of 
compensation. The New Zealand Federation of Commercial Fishermen has 
submitted a proposal for effort reduction which includes a compensation 
clause for those prepared to withdraw from the industry. However, this 
should be balanced by a fee system for quotas allocated to those 
remaining, as one would expect a rent value to accrue to the permits. 
This approach of a tendering buy-back ag~eement and a quota allocation 
based upon historical catch is the option under consideration by the 
Industry (MAF, 1984). As pointed out by Anderson (1983), the maximum 
rent will not accrue until the industry has had time to adjust to a 
cost minimum situation. This compensation problem is recognised by New 
Zealand managers (Duncan, 1984, MAF, 1984). The question of 
compensation appears to be a vexing one, and the long suffering 
taxpayer may be excused for wondering why the rents which should accrue 
to the nation are, in fact, negative rents being paid to retire 
vessels. Current proposals do, however, address this issue with 
provision for subsequent taxes upon the quotas to redistribute rents 
back to the taxpayer. 
CHAPTER 6 
ECONOMIES OF SCALE IN THE FISHING INDUSTRY 
This Chapter looks at the production function for harvesting 
(equation 3 in Chapter 3) in order to obtain some indication of 
economies of scale in the industry. The issue is important because 
indications of returns to scale in the factor inputs should indicate 
the operators to whom efficiently allocated quotas will eventually 
accrue. Economies of scale will often lead to few operators in an 
industry and possibly consequent problems of market power and equity 
considerations. Additionally, diseconomies of scale suggest that an 
effort transfer programme to alternative species becomes more viable, 
and this theme will be developed later in the report. 
The Minister of Fisheries, Mr Colin Moyle, is quoted (Catch, 
February 1985) as being concerned about a possible monopoly situation 
developing from the transfer of quotas to big companies from individual 
fisheries. This situation has happened in Australia? Following the 
introduction of transferable quotas for Australian southern bluefin 
tuna in late 1984, a very rapid transfer of quotas took place. By 
February 1985, some 90 percent of quotas were controlled by three 
Australian operators, and a geographical transfer of processing plants 
from Western Australia to South Australia was occurring. This is not 
necessarily a problem, depending upon the degree of market power 
exercised by the limited number of operators. 
Fuel and labour are assumed to be the factor inputs in equation 
3. Ex ante, (when building a vessel), fishers are faced with a degree 
of substitution between capital, fuel, and labour but there are likely 
to be limited substitution possibilities ex post (after the vessel has 
been built). In fact, zero substitution possibilities are assumed to 
exist ex post between factor inputs in subsequent analysis. 
Duality theory and 
returns to scale from cost 
cost function is represented 
m 
C (Y; P) = E hi (Y) pi 
i=l 
Sheppard's Lemma enable us 
data (Lau and Tamura, 1972). 
by 
to 
The 
estimate 
general 
(5) 
where Y represents output, P prices for both output and inputs, and 
there are m inputs. Corresponding to this cost function is the dual 
production function with constant and equal (to zero) elasticities of 
substitution (CES), i.e. a Leontief function. This function is a 
special case of the CES family of functions. A set of derived demands 
for the inputs Xi can be given by 
5 Pers Com, Robert Bain, Department of Primary Industries, 
Canberra, Australia, February 1985. 
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x = g. (Y), i = 1, ••• , m. 
i 1 
(6) 
The function g( ) is assumed to be a positive, real-valued and 
non decreasing function. 6 Using the form: 
Xi = Li Y 8 (7) 
where Li is a constant and i, also constant, is the scale coefficient 
enables us to estimate the Li and i by re-expressing (7) as 
LnXi = LnLi + BiLnY (8) 
for each input. Economies of scale are indicated by 8i < 1.0, constant 
re turns by 6i = L 0, and diseconomies by 13i > L ° (Lau and Tamura, 
1972). The standard economics definition of returns to scale is a 
measure of the change in output obtained from increasing all inputs by 
a constant proportion. This production function allows differential 
returns to scale of each input. 
Data to test for returns to scale were obtained from the New 
Zealand Fishing Industry Board. Cross-sectional observations for the 
1983 year for 56 trawlers in the 9 to 29 metre category with figures 
for sales, fuel costs, and crew wages were available. Results are 
therefore applicable to trawlers of this particular class size, and 
cannot be used to compare alternative harvesting techniques to 
trawling. Output is measured by the value of sales, and the assumption 
of a homogeneous fish catch across all sizes of vessels is. made. 
Results may be biased to the extent that fish species and product 
quality vary between vessels. Labour is paid as a share of total 
sales, and the quality of labour can expect to be rewarded by a higher 
factor return. Fuel prices were constant during 1983, thus no problems 
with changes during the study period were encountered. 
6 One peculiarity of this system of derived demand functions is 
that they are independent of input prices. This is because of 
the zero substitution possibilities that are assumed to exist ex 
post between the inputs. Thus subsequent analysis is valid to 
the extent that zero substitution does, in fact, exist between 
labour and fuel. Another important assumption made in duality 
theory is that fishers are operating on a minimum cost curve. 
TABLE 1 
Returns to Scale in the Fishing Industry 
Coefficient (6i) 
~2test B 
R 
F 
Observations 
Ho Si = 1.0 (constant returns) 
standard error 
Labour 
1.27 
13.95 
.77 
194 
56 
rejected 
.0909 
Fuel 
1.06 
15.60 
.81 
243 
56 
cannot be rejected 
.06796 
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Estimations of (8) are shown in Table 1. Using statistical t 
test (Koutsoyiannis 1977, p.84) we are unable to reject the hypothesis 
that Bi = 1.0 for the fuel input, but we can reject this hypothesis for 
the labour input. Accordingly, we conclude that constant returns to 
scale are indicated for fuel in the trawler fleet but diseconomies of 
scale exist to labour. Two implications arise from these conclusions. 
(a) Diseconomies of scale to labour suggest that the effort 
transfer option to be discussed later becomes more viable. The 
larger vessels are probably better able to harvest alternative 
species because of safety factors involved with harvesting 
further from the coast, and efficiency is enhanced by reducing 
labour input in the traditional species. 
(b) The existence of diseconomies of scale to labour and rejection 
of economies of scale to fuel lessen concern about the final 
distribution of quotas being held by few operators, given a 
free quota market. Thus the efficient solution of quotas may 
not necessarily have any long-run inherent tendency towards 
market concentration on the supply side. 
7 The Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) technique was applied to data 
supplied by the Fishing Industry Board. As cross sectional 
data is used, the validity of OLS requires an absence of 
heterosecedasticity. Using the Soldfeld and Quandt test 
(Koutsoyiannis, 1977), the observed F-statistics for labour and 
fuel were 0.2790 and 0.5947 respectively compared to the F 
critical of 2.19. We concluded that heterosecedasticity is not 
present in the model. 

CHAPTER 7 
EFFORT TRANSFER 
One of the major problems facing the inshore fishery is 
overcapitalisation. This problem may not be significant if financial 
resources could be diverted to other uses. There are two major 
economic reasons which tend to restrict the individual from 
transferring resources to alternative species - the opportunity cost 
incurred and the initial cost of developing a new industry. 
Without a system of quotas, an individual fisher harvesting 
alternative species faces an opportunity cost in foregoing harvest of 
the traditional species. Even though this fisher is contributing to 
the problems of overfishing a species, the individual knows harvesting 
that species is the most profitable use of the vessel. Foregoing this 
income may represent a considerable opportunity cost. However, if 
ITQ's are introduced, the individual can only harvest up to the quota 
level. Additional harvest of prime species must be matched by an 
acquisition of quotas on the market. Thus, there is no longer an 
opportunity cost involved in not harvesting the prime species. The 
question to both society and the fisher now is, "what is the best 
alternative use of vessels not being utilised"? The answer to this 
question can be obtained by looking at the potential to transfer effort 
to non-traditional species. Effort can be transferred by taking a 
particular class of vessel away from the traditional species, by 
transferring all vessels at a particular time, or by some combination 
of these possibilities. This of course raises questions of why the 
"non-traditional" species is not being harvested now. The answer may 
be a combination of factors, including the individual fisher's 
opportunity cost and the so-called "infant industry" cost. 
Research and development costs facing an individual in any new 
industry can be substantial. These costs involve information 
gathering, development of harvesting techniques, on board handling 
methods, processing technology, and marketing of the fish. Once these 
initial problems have been overcome, the cost structure for both the 
pioneer and others would decrease. Indeed, Samuelson et ale (1967) 
consider that fisheries effort transfer is a classic example of the 
infant industry problem: 
"Thus, a school for fishermen might become feasible when 
the industry grows to a certain size: and this training 
might cause a downward shift of every firm's cost curves 
as the industry Q rises", p.499. 
This section looks at some of the non-traditional species where 
effort may be transferred to, and discusses specific market failure 
cases where financial encouragement may be needed to either develop 
these species, increase the quality of existing catch or combinations 
of both of these concepts. 
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Potential species include discarded inshore species such as 
anchovy, barracuda, small red cod, conger eels, frostfish, small hoki 
and gemfish « 80 cm), grenadier, kahawai, jack mackerel, small 
monkfish « 25 cm), grey mullet, yellow eyed mullet, sea perch, 
pilchard, southern blue whiting, spiny dogfish, skates - small « 45 
cm) and large « 80 cm), rays, seadragons, seahorses, octopi, scampi, 
jellyfish, and crabs. Additionally, potential exists in fisheries 
which have traditionally been regarded as offshore, despite their 
proximity to the coast. Species include squid, southern bluefin tuna, 
skipjack, orange roughy, hoki, big eye tuna, yellowfin tuna, East Coast 
albacore and ribaldo. 
The squid fishery is very large. It is being managed to an 
estimated Total Allowance Catch (TAC) of 90,000 tonnes/year. At an 
average f.o.b. export price for 1983 of NZ$1.62/kg the resource is 
worth nearly NZ$150 million annually. It should be noted that this 
year the jigging fleet has extracted an extra 30,000 tonnes of squid 
over the theoretical TAC. Moreover squid prices are continuing to rise 
(Kitson, 1984). Thus the squid fishery alone is nearly as valuable as 
the total inshore catch. There has been little research into 
developing a method that is suitable for inshore vessels although 
fishers are convinced that profitable methods exist. But their cash 
flow cannot support sustained research. There are undoubtedly problems 
such as handling on board for quality and restricted quota access to 
the Japanese market (O'Donnell and Ting, 1984). Fishers also complain 
that the lights of the foreign and co-operative venture fleets draw the 
squid out to sea for distances of up to 20 miles. Two major methods of 
capture are used, jigging and bottom trawling, with the jig-caught 
squid usually commanding a premium on the Japanese market (Mattlin, 
1983). The squid caught by jigging are relatively costly, and more 
research needs to be conducted on New Zealand's participation in this 
industry. On the other hand, Colman (1983) considers that New Zealand 
has a major potential for developing our squid resource, with trawl 
squid becoming the basis for a substantial onshore processing industry. 
Southern bluefin tuna catches by Japanese longliners have been 
declining. However, it is still a very valuable fishery in the order 
of NZ$25 million f.o.b. in 1983 (Gibson, 1984 pers. comm. 8). New 
Zealanders on the West Coast have since 1979 developed a highly 
efficient method of catching bluefin which has not yet been transferred 
to the larger east coast fishery. By comparison, in 1982 the large 23 
crew Japanese longliners caught on average 5.6 bluefin/day. The small 
three crew West Coast trolling and handlining vessels landed 6.5 
blue fin/day of comparable quality. Developing an east coast, New 
Zealand catching operation has the dual effect of conserving both the 
inshore and the bluefin fisheries. On the one hand it transfers effort 
out of the inshore fishery and on the other it gives New Zealand 
fisheries managers a lever for reducing foreign effort. Harvesting of 
juvenile fish off the east coast of Australia and possible effects of 
EI Nino have contributed to the catch decline in the latest season for 
southern bluefin in New Zealand. O'Donnell and Sandrey (1983) 
8 D.J.M. Gibson, Scientiest, Fisheries Research Division, 
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries. 
estimated 
resource. 
organising 
potentially 
the value to both fishers and the nation of developing 
They concluded that providing fishers with information 
an initial catching and marketing operation resulted 
substantial returns to both individuals and the nation. 
this 
and 
in 
The declining catch is a classic "user cost" problem the 
small migratory fish are harvested by Australians for low value canning 
before they reach New Zealand waters at maturity. It is only carefully 
handled mature bluefin which are highly valued on the Japanese market. 
Recent research (Meuriot and Gates, 1983) show that foreign nations 
fishing in the U.S. 200 mile zone are enjoying a substantial wealth 
transfer as measured by willingness to pay. If these results are 
applicable to New Zealand and some of the surpluses can be captured by 
producers, later mature species may be profitable. Kennedy and Ivatkins 
(1984) developed a dynamic programming model to find optimal quotas and 
quota prices for harvesting of the southern bluefin tuna off the 
Australian coast. Results indicated that restricting or eliminating 
the Australian catch of under four year olds would benefit both 
Australia and Japan (New Zealand was not included in the analytical 
model, but would also benefit). Financial inducements should be able 
to be offered to Australian fishers by New Zealand fishers to reduce or 
eliminate fishing of southern bluefin. 
Orange roughy is currently being harvested off the Wairarapa 
Coast by Wellington trawlers, despite doubts that inshore vessels could 
harvest at 900 meters depth. This new glamour export fish was "known 
locally from only a few museum specimens until 1975" (Robertson and 
Grimes, 1983, p.lS). Ribaldo has been successfully gillnetted by 
Kaikoura fishers at 700 meters, and they now plan to try gillnetting at 
900 meters for orange roughy. There is also a considerable resource of 
slender tuna, particularly off the Otago Coast. 9 The D.S.I.R. is 
currently researching consumer acceptable ways of using this oily fish. 
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Jack mackerel is an example of a so-called less preferred 
specie. Robertson and Eggleston (cited in Jones, 1983) revised the New 
Zealand estimated yield of mackerel to between 48,000 and 187,000 
tonnes annually, and although Jones cautions that these estimates are 
"dubious", he considers that a large resource exists. The 1981/82 
average annual domestic inshore catch was 2,350 tonnes in contrast to a 
long term inshore yield of 30,000 tonnes (Jones, 1983). The use of a 
project manager to co-ordinate information and development may be a 
less costly alternative policy than vessel buyback schemes. 
Barracuda has topped domestic landings by volume in recent 
years (NAFMAC, 1983), and has an estimated long term yield of 30,000 
tonnes annually. This specie earned $10 million in export receipts for 
1983 (N.Z. Dept. of Statistics, 1984), and has considerable potential 
in South Island regions. A 15 month price subsidy was introduced in 
1980, and this contributed to increased catches in the subsequent year 
(Hurst, 1983). 
9 D. A. Robertson, Scientist, Fisheries Research Division, 
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries. 
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Perhaps the greatest potential resource (excluding squid) 
available to New Zealand fishers is hoki. While traditionally a 
deepwater specie Patchell (cited in New Zealand, FIB Bulletin, 1984 
(79» stresses that hoki is not simply a deepwater fish. He believes 
that hoki could in fact yield 300,000 tonnes per year if the stock size 
is as large as surveys estimate. This compares to an estimated 1983/84 
catch of some 37,000 tonnes, mostly deepwater. Hoki represents a major 
fishery for vessels in the 20 - 35 metre size range (New Zealand, FIB 
opp-cit.), but the same report cautions that correct marketing is 
required before the resource can realise its potential. 
7.1 Quality Improvement 
Allied with the effort transfer concept is quality improvement 
(value added) in both traditional and non-traditional species. Once 
again, we need to ask why this is not currently being undertaken if it 
is profitable. The answer in many cases is that individuals either do 
not have the knowledge or lack the resources to develop new markets. 
This implies a need for extension services in the first case, and some 
co-ordinating programme in the second. 
Higher prices for better quality is possible. The iki-jime 
technique (spiking the brain) coupled with meticulous handling has been 
widely used in Northland, Auckland and the Bay of Plenty. Current 
price schedule to the fishers is $4.90/kg for first grade iki Jlme 
snapper compared with $2.30/kg for trawl caught snapper (Peters, 1984, 
pers. comm. IO). Other species can also be prepared for the sashimi 
market, notably trevally, albacore and jack mackerel (Scott, 1984, 
pers. comm. II). Improvements in the general level of fish quality 
could be a result of efforts in establishing quality control 
programmes, quality assurance programmes, peer group pressure, better 
staff management, improved infrastructures, price differentials for 
quality or education programmes. Some programmes have been undertaken 
by the N.Z. Fishing Industry Board and the Fishing Industry Training 
Council. 
The D.S.I.R. Division of Horticulture and Processing carry 
responsibility for research into fish processing, and an estimate of an 
increase in "added value" of from 20% to 40% in the current returns 
from fishing is forecasted to occur by 1990. This "added value" will 
primarily come from a higher percentage of the "favoured species" catch 
sent out in prime quality and secondarily by the development of much 
more highly processed end-products (pers. comm. Dr R.L. Bieleski, 
Director, Division of Horticulture and Processing, D.S.I.R., December 
1984) . 
10 T. Peters, Managing Director, Kia Ora Fisheries. 
11 D Scott, Scientist, Fish Processing Research Group, Department 
of Scientific and Industrial Research. 
The catching method has a major impact on quality. Trawling 
generally lands a higher volume of lower quality fish with a shorter 
shelf life than lining. It is also relatively fuel intensive and 
capital intensive. A move to more benign catching methods would 
conserve stocks and is likely to increase the price. 
Hikurangi Fisheries gives a dramatic comparison. From January 
1 to March 1 1984 each of their pair trawling vessels caught over 15 
times the amount of snapper as the longliners and over 1500 times the 
amount of trevally. Despite this, current legislation prohibits them 
from transferring their licences from pair trawling to longlining. 
Yovich (1984, pers. comm. 12 ) says the trawlers would be just as 
profitable if converted to longlining because of lower costs and higher 
fish quality. 
In some ports poor quality is severely reducing the price. One 
extreme example is the quality of blue cod in Southland where it is 
regarded and used as rock lobster bait. 
Value is added to fish by maintaining it in a state as close to 
live as possible. Care in handling, processing, thawing, and 
transporting are the main concerns. However, special processing 
techniques such as brain ablation, cold anaesthesia and modified 
atmosphere packaging are available. There is a wide range of fish 
processing options such as free flow fillets, breaded fish pieces, 
compounded fish minces, and fermented, salted, brined, pickled, 
marinated, smoked, half dried and dried products. There are country 
specific products such as smoked jack mackerel for Europe, squid snacks 
for Asia and stranger still dried shark fin soups and ling bladder 
isinglass. Product development has been occurring rapidly although it 
is still only the tip of the iceberg. Increased government input is 
evidenced by the jump from two to seven fish processing scientists 
since 1979. One research project with exciting potential is a method 
to keep the fish muscle alive. 
12 A Yovich, Managing Director, Hikurangi Fisheries Limited. 
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CHAPTER 8 
APPLICATION OF PROPOSED POLICY TO SNAPPER 
The option of doing nothing and letting attrition of resources 
from the industry occur is one policy that needs to be considered. It 
has been dismissed by managers: "this particular option cannot be seen 
as realistic" (NAFMAC, 1983, p.ll). Under some conditions, a "do 
nothing" option may be less costly than the proposed compensation 
scheme. The following would lessen the need for an intervention 
. policy: 
1. Slow growth rate of the species. 
2. High discount rate imposed by society. 
3. Price not responsive to changes in supply. 
4. Decreasing real prices over time. 
5. Positive external effect resulting from a prey-predator 
relationship. 
6. Low opportunity value to excess capacity. 
7. High enforcement costs. 
8. High intervention costs. 
9. Large social impacts caused by a forced displacement of resources. 
10. Increased marginal cost from declining stocks. 
11. High level of catching skill required. 
12. High natural attrition rate. 
13. High levels of uncertainty regarding biological factors. 
Impacts of each of these conditions upon the economically 
optimal policy will be discussed in turn. The objective of this 
section is to show the differing effects that each will have upon 
either the economically optimal harvest rate or the net gains from 
intervention. Snapper will be used to elaborate upon some of the 
conditions, as snapper is a major species with some concern being 
expressed about its biological overfishing. Since different biological 
characteristics will often lead to different harvest policies, the 
generalisations discussed using snapper may not necessarily be valid 
for all fish species. 
Snapper is the main inshore specie by value, for which NAFMAC 
(1983) suggest a 44% interim and 24% long term reduction in yield is 
needed. Regional differences are more dramatic - a 77% interim and 46% 
long term reduction are suggested for the Bay of Plenty region. Major 
concern has also been expressed over the Hauraki Gulf snapper fishery. 
This area landed 40% of the New Zealand snapper catch for the 1981/82 
years, but in spite of concern over the species, only a 10% long term 
yield reduction is proposed (NAFMAC, 1983). 
The total long term yield has been revised upwards from 8,100 
tonnes/year (NAFMAC, 1983) to 8,500 tonnes/year (MAF, 1984) with no 
explanation as to why these figures have been altered. This latest 
long term yield of 8,500 tonnes is only 250 tonnes less than the actual 
1983 catch, and represents a decrease of some 3% (MAF, 1984). A 
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reduction in yield of 3% would, at first glance, suggest that 
management have a very clear indication of both the biological and 
economic relationships operating to enable a target yield to be 
administratively set so close to the current open access yield! Table 
1 shows the historical catch of snapper in recent years, together with 
the proposed interim yield and long term yield. It is this fall in 
yield which is raising concerns about biological overfishing in the 
industry. 
TABLE 2 
Reported Domestic Landings and Resource 
Estimates for New Zealand Snapper 
Year 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
Interim Yield 
Long Term Yield 
Reported Landing (tonnes) 
13,733 
11,638 
14,346 
12,559 
17,660 
16,379 
12,073 
11,940 
10,683 
8,729 
6,000 
8,500 
================================================== 
Source: MAF, 1984 
8.1 Biological Growth Rate 
Economic efficiency is achieved when marginal costs are equated to 
marginal benefits. Costs include the opportunity cost of earlier 
capture and reinvestment of the funds received as well as direct 
fishing costs and normal profit. Benefits include changes in value of 
future harvest if the stocks are left and the value of retained stocks 
in breeding, which is termed the user cost. Individuals will only 
recognise the user cost and changes in value of future harvest if they 
have an incentive to do so. This incentive is lacking in an open 
access situation. 
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Snapper are a long lived species which are thought to live for 50 
to 60 years. Using data from Vooren and Coombs (1977) the following 
rate of change in average weight for snapper was estimated. 
TABLE 3 
Snapper Growth Rates 
===================~========================= 
Age (years) 
0-1 
1-2 
2-3 
3-4 
4-5 
6-7 
7-8 
8-9 
9-10 
10-11 
Rate of Change (%) 
300 
100 
50 
30 
20 
12 
10 
9 
8 
============================================= 
Source: Vooren and Coombs (1977) 
Table 2 gives some indication of possible changes in value, 
assuming a homogeneous price of snapper. Incorporating both a 
mortality rate and price changes over time into the analysis would 
allow the optimal harvest age to be calculated. The problem of 
selective harvesting to maintain breeding stocks is unanswered in this 
report. 
8.2 Discount Rates 
Most public projects in New Zealand are required to pass the 
criteria of a 10% real discount rate. This is a high real rate, and 
would probably have a devastating impact upon fish stocks if the same 
criteria is applied to the fishing industry. However, some positive 
rate of interest must be used, suggesting that economically and 
biologically optimal yields will differ (Larkin, 1977). 
Suggested snapper interim yields are 5,950 tonnes and long term 
yiels of 8,100 tonnes annually on a national basis (see Table 1). 
Given a positive discount rate and slow biological growth rate for 
snapper, it is difficult to see the justification for divergence 
between interim and long term yields. Social adjustment costs and a 
possible low opportunity value of vessels would further question the 
logic of diverging interim and long term yields. A high adjustment 
cost incurred early in the programme is likely to outweigh future 
benefits if those benefits are discounted. 
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8.3 Price Responsiveness 
Factors likely to influence the price of snapper are supply of 
snapper, cross elasticities with substitutes such as other fish, 
chicken and red meats, marketing effort, and New Zealand's relative 
share of exports. Exports to the year ended December 1983 were 
$19,022,535 for snapper, suggesting that foreign markets determine New 
Zealand's domestic price. However, New Zealand's influence on the 
world snapper market is only slight. 
Snapper has many substitutes, both alternative fish species and 
other protein forms, which would increase the elasticity of the 
domestic market. Any reduction in supply will initially reduce 
consumers' welfare. ~-Jhether that welfare will be reduced in the medium 
"to long term will depend, amongst other factors, upon substitutability 
of alternative species. If the export market is the residual market 
then foreign consumers will bear the full loss in consumer surplus, the 
extent depending on the effect of the reduction on the world market. 
The current policy proposals do not seem clear as to possible 
price effects of supply control. In one section (page 13), the MAF 
report argues "it is considered that the effect of sale restrictions on 
the industry and consumer should be minor", while later (page 18) it is 
argued that "both local and export markets can expect increases in unit 
values of inshore species". Some estimate of price effects would 
enable both the true cost of supply control and the sectors bearing 
that cost to be better identified. 
8.4 Changes in Real Prices Over Time 
Snapper prices, as measured on the Japanese market, have been 
increasing in real terms over the 1979-1984 period. These prices are 
shown in Graph 1. Increasing real prices negate the effects of a 
discount rate, and reduces the optimal harvest level. Conservation is 
encouraged. For the same reason, continual depreciation of the New 
Zealand currency vis a vis major trading partners would also act as an 
incentive to conserve snapper for future harvest. 
NZ $ 
1979 = 100 7.00 
6.50 
6.00 
5.00 
4.00 
GRAPH 1 
Average Snapper AuctIon Prices Tsukiji/kg 
Expressed in Real N.Z. Dollars 
1979 i 1981 
- - --
i 
1983 
Source: New Zealand F.I.B. Bulletin July/August 1984, (77) 
8.5 Prey-Predator Relationships 
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Snapper predation may be harming mussel beds in the Harlborough 
Sounds. Although this example is a regional problem, it is an example 
of prey-predator relationships. Paddle crab predation on toheroa beds 
and octopus predation on rock lobster are further examples of this. If 
strong predation is occurring, then it is beneficial to increase the 
harvest rate of the predator to increase harvest of the prime species. 
8.6 Opportunity Value of Excess Capacity 
Overcapitalisation by size of vessels in the fishing industry 
would indicate that larger vessels should be withdrawn from the 
industry, in contrast to the management option of withdrawing smaller 
vessels. Prospects for transferring effort to alternative species are 
also enhanced. Some preliminary work on catch rates by size of vessel 
are discussed in the NAFHAC (1983) report, and concludes that "40% of 
the fleet comprised of trawlers greater than 18 meters may incur 
significant losses". Alternative uses of smaller vessels may be 
limited - the only other usage of vessels already excluded may be as 
pleasure craft. However, even if vessels have no ~lternative use, it 
may be better to scrap equipment than to consider overfishing. 
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Alternative usage of capacity is a stronger argument for transferring 
effort than for continuing to overfish a particular species. If 
vessels have a high opportunity value in an alternative usage, then 
restricting effort becomes more attractive. The cost of supply control 
is reduced. 
The preliminary analysis discussed in Chapter 6 on economies of 
scale supports the view that larger vessels should be transferred to 
alternative species, and a major thesis of this report is that effort 
transfer should be encouraged along with supply control. 
8.7 Enforcement Costs 
To be effective, a system of individual transferable quotas 
must be enforceable and effectively enforced. Specification of 
penalties for violations must be made clear. Randall (1981) considers 
that Pareto Efficiency is ensured where a set of nonattenuated property 
rights includes specification, exclusion, transferability, and 
enforcement. Thus although individual transferable quotas are 
relatively cost effective, they are nevertheless high and may negate 
the benefits derived from legislation. We must concur with both the 
Treasury Report (page 88) which states: "However, it is not completely 
clear as yet whether the costs of implementing ITQ's would outweigh the 
benefits in the New Zealand inshore fishery", and Dasgupta (1982, p.29) 
who writes: "Endowing private property rights on what was once a 
common-property resource is not necessarily a move towards greater 
welfare". Larkin (1983) expands upon this issue in a cost-benefit 
framework, and concludes that "expenditures on management should be 
justified by the contribution they will make to increasing the net 
social and economic revenue from the resources". 
8.8 Intervention Costs 
Enforcement costs are only one aspect of the total intervention 
costs. These costs can, for example, include the cost of specifying 
the wrong harvest level. In a complex biological system, such as the 
New Zealand multispecie fishery, these intervention costs may be 
substantial, and the reader is referred to Wilson (1982) for further 
discussion. 
8.9 Social Costs 
Social impacts of displacing fishers by arbitrary measures can be 
considerable. This problem has not been addressed in the current 
debate, particularly with respect to part-time operators. The snapper 
fishery is particularly affected by social impacts because it is 
harvested by a large proportion of recreationalists, part-timers and 
small operators. Social costs arise from displacement in many sectors 
of the economy, and as Wilson (1982) concludes, it is not clear that 
management imposition of property rights gives rise to greater net 
social benefits than the current system. In a period of relatively 
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high unemployment, as exists in New Zealand, should emphasis be given 
to labour enhancing technologies such as the iki-jime longliners. 
8.10 Impact of Declining Stocks on Harvesting Costs 
Natural market forces operate to protect the species where effort 
per unit of harvest increases as stocks decrease. However, some 
species are relatively easy to harvest at specific times and locations 
such as during spawning. Often trawling catches large volumes of 
spawning snapper on the trawl grounds, a situation which may need 
consideration. It is important to emphasise that intervention is only 
justifiable in the event of market failure. In the case of fishing, 
this failure occurs if harvest costs do not rise as stocks decline. 
Given that costs do rise, then we do not need to become so concerned 
about biological overfishing. An answer to the question "what happens 
to marginal harvest costs as stocks decline?" will provide much insight 
into the need to regulate a fishery. 
8.11 Acquired Skills 
Individuals' skill and knowledge acquired over time may also 
alter catch to effort ratios. This is the cost of acquiring knowledge 
on the location of fish at any time, and the skill factor involved may 
be high. If this skill factor is high, less justification can be made 
for restricting entry into the fishery because skill acts as a natural 
barrier. Snapper in the north eastern waters of New Zealand does not 
have this skill barrier compared to other fisheries and regions. 
8.12 Natural Attrition Rate 
Attrition can be rapid from the fishing industry. In June 1984 
alone, an estimated $4 million of vessels sank off the New Zealand 
coastline. Does this revise the $28 million buy-back costs downwards 
by a corresponding amount. Restricting further entry into the industry 
may be adequate to ensure protection in the medium term if attrition is 
high. 
8.13 Uncertainty 
Uncertainty has scarcely been addressed in this paper. Some 
species have much more information available with a greater degree of 
certainty than others. Snapper is one of the species where there is 
relatively more knowledge, and therefore intervention is more easily 
justified. 
All of the above factors need to be considered before it can be 
concluded that benefits will accrue to society from intervention. Many 
authors are concerned that net benefits to justify intervention cannot 
be demonstrated. Wilson (1982) concludes with "there is no reason to 
believe, in strong contrast to standard theory, that fisheries 
resource property rights or their bureaucratic simulation provide a 
clearly superior and socially economical institutional context foe the 
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management of fisheries" (p.433). If biological overfishing is taking 
place, then this will impose a cost to society in the form of a user 
cost" whereby present harvest is .':it the expense of future consumption. 
Correcting for this overfishing will result in a change in the expected 
benefit stream accruing to socIety. Given that the change in this 
income stream increases the discounted present value expected froin the 
resource, we have to look at administration and other costs involved in 
moving from the present system. Only when the benefits can be shown to 
clearly outweigh the costs involved can we affirm that a change away 
from the present system is economically efficient. 
The current debate has, until now, focused on two parties 
larger, full-time fishers and management agencies. Small part-time 
operators have been dismissed. Neither consumers nor taxpayers have 
been considered. Other participants include processors, displaced 
workers, and the citizens of New Zealand as owners of the resource. 
CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSIONS 
Overfishing is occurring in some inshore species of fish in New 
Zealand waters, although the problem varies by region. The problem is 
shown to be the almost inevitable result of a common resource where the 
individual fisher has no direct incentive to maintain fish stocks. 
This overfishing imposes a cost in the form of reduced future harvests, 
the present value of which is known as the user cost. Several policy 
options are available to restrict current harvest. Each of these 
policy instruments have different adjustment mechanisms to achieve the 
same goal. 
Taxes on either inputs or output are an appealing solution. 
The externality costs are internalised, and the individual fisher's 
marginal cost curve is moved to the left in the event of input taxes or 
the marginal revenue curve is moved to the right if the tax is placed 
on output. Effort is reduced in both cases. Difficulties of the tax 
system include the lack of flexibility and the problem of adjusting the 
system to adapt to stochastic changes in the biological resource. 
Also, there is a major political problem. If taxes are increased, then 
the result will be that fishers' incomes will be reduced. Thus 
overcoming the original problem of overfishing leads to the more 
sensitive issue of low incomes in the industry. Accentuating this 
overfishing and low income problem is asset fixity - capital tied up in 
the industry has nowhere else to go, and forcing one fisher to leave 
the industry allows another to operate on a lower cost curve because 
the vessel has been "written down". 
Licensing either operators or vessels is not addressing the 
cause of the problem, and technological change allows effort to be 
maintained or even increased. Artificial methods such as gear 
restrictions or season closures may work to protect the fish stocks, 
but at the cost of an inefficient industry. Operators must be allowed 
to move to a least-cost situation in order to ensure a correct 
allocation of societies capital and labour resources. 
The final option of quotas, and specifically transferrable 
quotas has much to offer from a theoretical point of view. An open 
market system allows entry and compensated (by selling quotas) exit 
from the industry. Economic efficiency is ensured as fishers can 
adjust to a least cost operation within the quota system. However, a 
word of caution must be sounded about the costs of ITQ's. These costs 
include administration and enforcement costs. Given many small 
operators and numerous market channels these may be significant. 
Several distributional issues need to be addressed if ITQ's are 
introduced. One of these has already been decided, as part-timers have 
been excluded from the industry. The allocation of quotas raises two 
questions, how should the allocation be made and to whom should rents 
accrue. The proposed tendering and buy back system is equitable if the 
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rents. are captured by the residents of New Zealand as owners of the 
fish stock and not distributed as windfall gains to fishers. 
Once some measures have been put in place to restrict 
overfishing, the other major problem of excessive capacity in the 
industry has, by definition, occurred. Transferring effort to 
alternative species will help to alleviate this. Two factors combine 
to lessen the economic incentive to currently harvest these less 
preferred species - the opportunity cost to the fisher of harvesting 
prime species and the infant industry problem of initially obtaining 
expertise in capturing, handling, processing, and marketing these 
species. Introducing ITQ's soves the first problem, and a major 
extension and marketing programme may be needed to use the excess 
capacity created by restricting the harvest of prime species in some 
alternative way. While recognising that ex ante determination of 
likely winners is difficult, expenditure on research and development 
may alleviate the need for a buy-back scheme. Harvest costs are 
initially lowered if resources withdrawn from the traditional species 
are used, and initial development expenditure may be needed to achieve 
economies of scale in new areas. Consideration needs to be given to 
the impact of supply control upon those other than the harvesting 
sector involved in the industry. Transferring effort to 
non-traditional and under-utilised species provides an excellent 
opportunity to ensure that any overcapacity resulting from supply 
control is productively used. 
Many possible alternative species exist, from previously 
discarded species to squid and relatively new species such as hoki and 
orange roughy which have been thought of as deep-water species. 
Although the introduction of ITQ's and a programme to divert the 
industry into alternative species may appear to be two separate 
policies, they are in fact related by the use of the excess capacity. 
A preliminary analysis of the factor inputs used by fishers suggests on 
economic efficiency grounds that larger vessels should be diverted from 
the traditional species, and this would also enhance the feasibility of 
an effort transfer programme. 
Before any intervention policy is adopted it must be 
demonstrated that clear economic benefits result from a change in the 
present system. The paper has argued that the presence of biological 
overfishing is not clear proof for the need to restructure the 
industry. Intervention can only be justified where market failures are 
demonstrated, and the economically optimal harvest may well be 
different from the biologically optimal harvest. Several factors can 
cause this divergence. They include discount rates, changes in the 
real price of a species, the growth, reproductive, and mortality rates 
of a species and stochastic influences. Additionally, the nature of a 
fisher's cost curve, total costs of adopting and administrating a 
supply control policy and the opportunity cost of excess capacity 
generated need to be considered before it is clear that intervention to 
change the present harvest level is justified. 
However, the final word should be that if supply control is 
introduced, then ITQ's are an economically efficient system provided 
that enforcement and administration costs are not excessive. Equity is 
ensured if rents accrue to the residents of New Zealand, and the 
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industry in general need not suffer if consideration is given to an 
effort transfer programme. 
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